
Cover image supplied from the owner-authorized Psychology Notebook reserve.
Enki Bilal, Zen Buddhism, and the Psychology of Losing Yourself
Imagine being an immortal god.
You've survived thousands of years. Watched entire civilisations appear and disappear. Seen humanity invent religion, technology, capitalism, and probably several thousand varieties of disappointing relationships.
And then, one day, you're informed that you have seven days left to live.
Naturally, you panic.
Which is already a rather interesting observation.
Apparently, even immortality doesn't cure the fear of death.
This is the starting point of Enki Bilal's extraordinary 2004 film Immortal (Ad Vitam), a strange mixture of science fiction, Egyptian mythology, cyberpunk, and existential anxiety.
And beneath its bizarre visual universe lies a question that connects surprisingly well with both psychology and Zen Buddhism.
What exactly are we trying to preserve when we're desperately trying to preserve ourselves?
A God in Need of a Human Body
The year is 2095.
New York has become a sprawling, technologically advanced dystopia populated by humans, mutants, genetically modified beings, and people whose relationship with their original biology has become rather negotiable.
Above the city floats a mysterious Egyptian pyramid.
Inside, ancient gods are deciding the fate of Horus.
The verdict is unpleasant.
He has seven days before his execution.
Horus needs a way to survive, and his solution is characteristically divine.
Find a suitable human body. Take possession of it. Use it to pursue his own purposes.
No particularly extensive consultation with the owner appears necessary.
The unfortunate host is Alcide Nikopol, a political prisoner who has spent thirty years in suspended animation.
Nikopol awakens in a future he doesn't recognise, in a body he can no longer entirely control.
His life has been interrupted.
His world has disappeared.
And now an Egyptian god is sharing his nervous system.
The arrangement is not ideal.
But it does raise an interesting psychological question.
If someone else controls what your body does, in what sense are you still living your own life?
The Difference Between Having a Body and Being in Control
Psychology and neuroscience distinguish between two experiences we ordinarily take for granted.
The sense of ownership is the feeling that this body belongs to me.
The sense of agency is the feeling that I am initiating and controlling my actions.
Usually, these experiences work together.
I decide to lift my hand.
My hand moves.
I experience myself as the person performing the action.
Very convenient.
But they are not identical processes.
Experiments involving body illusions and studies of certain neurological conditions show that ownership and agency can become dissociated.
Bilal turns this distinction into a spectacularly uncomfortable science-fiction problem.
Nikopol has a body.
But the body doesn't always obey him.
Horus can act through it, pursue goals Nikopol hasn't chosen, and turn its existence into an instrument of divine survival.
And the most disturbing thing about this situation is not the supernatural possession itself.
It's the loss of authorship.
Nikopol is present.
But someone else is making decisions about his existence.
This is one of the more interesting ways to think about psychological autonomy.
Autonomy isn't simply having unlimited freedom to do whatever we want.
It involves having some meaningful ability to participate in the decisions that shape our own lives.
Without that, even an extraordinary existence can become a rather elaborate form of captivity.
Jill and the Question of Who We Are
Then there's Jill.
A mysterious woman with blue hair, blue tears, and an uncertain relationship with human biology.
She becomes the centre of Horus's attempt to preserve his existence.
But Jill has a problem that goes beyond her unusual physiology.
Her identity is unstable.
Her origins are obscure. Her memory is vulnerable to manipulation. Other people and institutions treat her body as something that can be studied, altered, and used.
She's surrounded by people who seem to know what she is supposed to be.
The difficulty is that they aren't particularly interested in asking her.
And this is where the film becomes an unsettling meditation on identity.
We usually think of ourselves as continuous beings.
I am the person who remembers yesterday, makes decisions today, and imagines tomorrow.
But what happens when memory becomes unreliable?
Or when the body changes?
Or when other people repeatedly determine what your life is supposed to mean?
Psychological research suggests that autobiographical memory plays an important role in constructing our sense of personal continuity.
Our memories aren't simply a library of past events.
They help organise our understanding of who we have been and what we might become.
But memory isn't the whole of identity.
People can experience significant changes in memory, body, or circumstances without ceasing to be persons.
And that distinction matters enormously in a film where a human being can become a biological resource for someone else's ambitions.
Zen Has a Different Idea of the Self
Now here's where the comparison becomes particularly interesting.
One of the central Buddhist ideas is anātman, usually translated as not-self.
In simplified terms, it challenges the notion that somewhere inside us exists a permanent, independent, unchanging essence that constitutes our true identity.
What we call the self emerges through changing physical and psychological processes.
Sensations.
Perceptions.
Memories.
Emotions.
Intentions.
Relationships.
None exists entirely independently of the others.
Zen develops this understanding through practice, emphasising the possibility of experiencing life without constantly dividing the world into a rigid self and everything outside it.
At first glance, this sounds almost like Bilal's universe.
Bodies are fluid.
Identities change.
The boundaries between human, machine, and divine consciousness become unstable.
But there's a crucial difference.
Zen questions our attachment to a fixed self. Bilal shows what happens when powerful beings refuse to respect another person's selfhood.
These are not the same thing.
Recognising that identity is dynamic doesn't mean that people have no dignity, boundaries, or right to decide what happens to their bodies.
Not-self is not an invitation to erase someone else's individuality.
And spiritual freedom cannot be confused with being deprived of agency.
In fact, the contrast makes Horus particularly interesting.
The Immortal Who Cannot Let Go
Horus is a god.
He possesses extraordinary power.
He can inhabit another body, manipulate events, and operate according to rules that ordinary humans cannot even begin to understand.
Yet he remains frightened by something entirely familiar.
The possibility that he might cease to exist.
From a Buddhist perspective, this makes him a particularly compelling character.
Not because he is immortal.
But because he is attached.
Attached to continuing.
Attached to his own importance.
Attached to preserving an identity that he cannot imagine surrendering.
And the more urgently he tries to preserve himself, the less concerned he becomes with the lives of others.
Which is a rather dark illustration of what can happen when self-preservation becomes an absolute value.
In Buddhism, clinging describes the tendency to grasp at experiences, identities, and conditions we want to preserve.
It doesn't mean that wanting to live is inherently wrong.
Nor does it mean that suffering or death should be welcomed with indifference.
The problem is the belief that lasting security can be obtained by making something fundamentally changeable permanent.
Horus has spent an eternity being a god.
Yet seven remaining days are enough to expose the fragility of his entire identity.
Perhaps the real problem was never mortality.
It was his inability to accept that even gods might have to change.
When Transcendence Becomes an Excuse
There's an uncomfortable ethical element to the story that shouldn't be overlooked.
Horus's use of Nikopol's body and his pursuit of Jill involve coercion and sexual violence.
The film's treatment of these events is troubling, particularly when the narrative also introduces the possibility of romantic connection.
It's tempting, when discussing mystical themes, to interpret the crossing of bodily boundaries as a symbolic union of identities.
But that would be a serious mistake here.
A violation of consent doesn't become spiritual simply because the perpetrator is a god.
And an encounter involving multiple consciousnesses doesn't automatically represent a beautiful dissolution of the ego.
Psychological agency matters.
Consent matters.
The other person's ability to refuse matters.
This is also where a thoughtful reading of Zen becomes ethically useful.
Non-attachment is not indifference to other people's suffering.
Buddhist traditions place considerable importance on compassion and ethical conduct.
If the apparent transcendence of individuality requires destroying someone else's autonomy, we should probably question whether anything has actually been transcended.
Perhaps we've simply found a particularly sophisticated excuse for domination.
A World Made of Artificial People
There's another reason Bilal's film is fascinating.
Its visual language is itself a hybrid.
Real actors interact with computer-generated characters.
Human faces appear beside artificial bodies.
Ancient gods inhabit a world of advanced biotechnology.
Some figures seem alive.
Others look deliberately synthetic.
Even the city feels assembled from different realities that don't quite belong together.
For a film made in 2004, the visual effects can look unmistakably artificial today.
But I find that artificiality strangely appropriate.
In this world, almost nothing has a stable identity.
Not the bodies.
Not the memories.
Not the gods.
Not even the cinematic images themselves.
The film constantly asks us to accept characters that are somewhere between living and simulated.
And perhaps the awkwardness of that coexistence is more interesting than perfect technological realism would have been.
It forces us to confront a question that increasingly belongs to our own world.
If we can modify, reproduce, or simulate more and more aspects of human existence, what exactly are we preserving?
A body?
A personality?
A pattern of information?
A memory?
Or the capacity of a living being to experience and participate in its own life?
Immortality Is Not Freedom
Modern culture is extraordinarily interested in extending life.
We want better medicine, younger bodies, stronger cognitive abilities, and technologies that might eventually preserve consciousness itself.
Some of these ambitions are genuinely valuable.
Reducing suffering and extending healthy life are reasonable goals.
But Bilal reminds us that extending existence and improving the experience of existing are two different projects.
Horus wants to survive.
Nikopol wants his life back.
Jill wants something more fundamental: the possibility of being herself, rather than whatever someone else has decided she should become.
One seeks continuation.
The others seek agency and identity.
And these goals are not interchangeable.
This also connects to a familiar psychological problem.
We often imagine that life will become meaningful once some condition is finally satisfied.
When we become successful.
When we obtain security.
When we find the right relationship.
When we eliminate the possibility of loss.
But every attempt to guarantee an unchanging future can become another way of refusing to engage with the present.
Zen offers no guarantee of immortality.
It doesn't promise a permanent identity that can be preserved untouched by experience.
Instead, it invites attention to life as something that is happening, changing, and interconnected.
Not something we can finally secure against all possible transformation.
The Strange Freedom of Being Mortal
Perhaps the most interesting question in Immortal isn't whether Horus succeeds.
It's whether the thing he's trying to preserve is actually worth preserving in its present form.
What good is immortality if its preservation requires sacrificing other people's freedom?
What good is perfect continuity if there is no room for change?
And what good is possessing a body if the life being lived through it is not your own?
Zen doesn't provide a convenient technological answer.
Psychology cannot resolve the metaphysical question of what survives death.
And Bilal has very little interest in making the universe reassuring.
But together they suggest something worth considering.
We spend enormous effort trying to make our identities stable, our lives predictable, and our existence secure.
Yet some of the experiences that make life meaningful require precisely the opposite.
Change.
Vulnerability.
Uncertainty.
The possibility that who we are today is not exactly who we will be tomorrow.
Perhaps the opposite of mortality isn't immortality. It's the ability to participate fully in a life that cannot be made permanent.
Horus has seven days to save his eternity.
Nikopol and Jill have something considerably more difficult to recover.
The freedom to live lives that actually belong to them.
And if I had to choose between those two achievements, I'm not entirely sure the immortal god has the better deal.
Framework and scope
The parallels between Bilal, Zen and psychology are interpretive, not evidence of an intended Buddhist message. Immortality, synthetic bodies, divine consciousness and supernatural possession are fictional premises; possession has no direct clinical equivalent. Buddhist non-self is not loss of agency, involuntary possession, dissociation or destruction of personal identity. Changes in memory need not erase personhood. Horus’s coercion and sexual violence are not consensual spiritual union. Non-attachment does not diminish autonomy, rights or consent, and cinematic visual hybridity does not prove a psychological theory.
References
- Enki Bilal (2004), UGC Distribution, UGC Distribution: Immortel (Ad Vitam)
- Uroš Matić (2023), Egyptomania, Sex and Ontology in Enki Bilal's The Nikopol Trilogy and Immortel
- Toma Monica Alina, Hybridité et fragmentation dans l'univers dystopique et posthumain du film Immortel
- Patrick Haggard (2017), Sense of Agency in the Human Brain
- Braun et al. (2018), The Senses of Agency and Ownership: A Review
- Conway & Pleydell-Pearce (2000), The Construction of Autobiographical Memories in the Self-Memory System
- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Japanese Zen Buddhist Philosophy
